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Abstract 
Cognitive modeling is the effort to understand the mind by implementing theories of 
the mind in computer code producing measures comparable to human behavior and 
mental activity. The community of cognitive modelers has traditionally met twice 
every three years at the International Conference on Cognitive Modeling (ICCM). In 
this special issue of topiCS, we present the best papers from the ICCM meeting. (The 
full proceedings are available on the ICCM website.) These best papers represent 
advances in the state of the art in cognitive modeling. Since ICCM was for the first time 
also held jointly with the Society for Mathematical Psychology, we use this preface to 
also reflect on the similarities and differences between mathematical psychology and 
cognitive modeling.    
 
 
Cognitive modeling is the effort to understand the mind by implementing theories of the mind 
in computer code producing measures comparable to human behavior and mental activity. This 
year’s meeting was held with the annual meeting of the Society for Mathematical Psychology. 
This allowed for a lot of cross-talk between communities that both devote themselves to 
modeling cognition, but in very different ways. The best papers presented in this special issue 
are representative of the advances in the state of the art in cognitive modeling discussed at the 
meeting. 
 
The conference demonstrated very well how cognitive modeling could be used to capture 
complex cognitive phenomena. As two of the papers in this special issue demonstrate, cognitive 
models can implement verbal theories of psychiatric problems such as rumination (van Vugt et 
al., this issue) and aphasia (Mätzig et al., this issue). The advantage of such simulations is that it 
helps to clarify the nature of the theories, and allows for making predictions about novel 
situations (in the case of psychiatry, potentially the effect of different interventions). Other 
talks at the conference itself demonstrated that cognitive architectures could also help to 
model the effects of emotion on cognition (Chris Dancy), or the effects of meditation on 
attention (Amir Moye & Marieke van Vugt). In addition, since cognitive architectures typically 
describe the interaction between different resources, they are a natural model for the 
interaction between brain areas, as was demonstrated during the conference by Andrea Stocco. 
Moreover, cognitive architectures can quite literally model whole-brain activity when placed 
together in an architecture consisting of simulated neurons such as Nengo (Eliasmith et al., 
2012). Such complex systems are difficult to model in simple equations that do not have a 
mechanism to exert control operations over what processes take place at any particular 
moment.  
 
The paper by Dotlačil (this issue), moves the field forward by showing how ACT-R models can be 
used to model eye movements during reading. The data fit were eye movements while 
participants were reading an Agatha Christie book, and the author shows how the model can 
predict the modulation of gaze duration and reading time on the basis of word frequency, word 
position, and word length. Interestingly, this paper also introduces Bayesian methods for 
estimating model parameters (in contrast to the fit-by-hand that is common in the cognitive 
modeling community). 
 
A second paper by Mätzig, Vasishth, Englemann, Caplan, and Burchert (this issue) used an ACT-
R model based on previous work to evaluate three hypotheses about the observed lower 
comprehension of sentences by people with aphasia. They demonstrated tighter clustering of 
model parameters that matched control subjects’ behavior compared to those matching the 
behavior of individuals with aphasia. This demonstrated that differences between the two 
groups could be explained by different model parameters.  
 
Another domain in which cognitive models can be used is computational psychiatry. Van Vugt, 
van der Velde, and ESM-MERGE Investigators (this issue) show how cognitive architectures can 
implement verbal theories of psychiatric problems. Specifically, they show how one theory of 
depressive rumination--that of maladaptive thought habits--can be implemented in the ACT-R 
cognitive architecture by changing the contents of its simulated memory. These manipulations 
of memory habits lead the model to show impairments in a sustained attention task--a 
plausible impairment given that people who suffer from depression have concentration 
complaints. The paper has another interesting feature: it uses experience sampling data (self-
report data collected with frequent intervals over the course of daily life) as a data source for 
modeling. These data are becoming more and more easy to acquire with the increasing 
prevalence of smartphones, and may therefore be an interesting source of data for future 
cognitive modeling studies. 
 
In human probabilistic reasoning, we are known to have systematic biases. Costello and Watts 
(this issue) report on investigating two central aspects of probabilistic reasoning through the 
use a cognitive model of inferential probability judgement. Their general model of descriptive 
probability estimation, inferential probability judgement, and the interactions between these 
two processes made predictions about patterns of agreement and disagreement by people and 
probability theory that were well supported by experimental results.  These results imply that 
biases in decision making may be explained with noise and without heuristics. 
 
Another apparent trend was the use of neuroscience. The data from neuroscience and 
physiological studies provide data beyond only behavioral data, which generates additional 
constraints on the cognitive model. For example, Jelmer Borst showed how a Nengo model can 
describe both behavioral and magnetoencephalography (MEG) data collected during an 
associative recognition memory task. The need to fit multiple event-related potentials adds 
substantial constraints to the model. 
 
Since the ICCM conference was held for the first time together with the Society for 
Mathematical Psychology, an important question is whether the fields of mathematical 
psychology and cognitive modeling can learn from each other, and whether more interaction is 
warranted. Mathematical psychology typically concerns itself with relatively simple models 
consisting of one or two equations that focus on a single phenomenon (such as signal detection 
theory for recognition memory; see (Kellen et al., 2016) for a recent example), while cognitive 
modeling typically concerns itself with large-scale cognitive architectures that can be used to 
model different tasks. Below we outline a few key characteristics of both approaches to 
modeling cognition that can be of benefit. 
 
The mathematical modeling approach also has various features that may be of interest to the 
cognitive modeling community. Specifically, mathematical psychology modelers place a lot of 
emphasis on comparing models by looking at the number of parameters these models have 
(Pitt et al., 2002). In contrast, model comparison is relatively less common activity in the 
cognitive modeling community (cf., Myers et al, 2010), in part because it is not easy to define 
the degrees of freedom (and therefore the parameters) of a cognitive architecture model. 
Nevertheless, a comparison of different versions of a model (e.g., excluding certain production 
rules) could be a beneficial practice to be adopted from the mathematical psychology 
community. Another important method in mathematical psychology is the systematic search of 
parameter spaces for the optimal parameters for predicting a certain behavior (while in the 
cognitive modeling community parameter searches are often done by hand). Such searches 
range from grid search (systematically trying out all possible combinations of model 
parameters) to stochastic methods such as genetic algorithms or Markov-Chain Monte Carlo 
(see also Dotlačil, this issue). Moreover, such searches do not need to choose between the 
individual-subject or group-level, but make more and more use of hierarchical Bayesian 
estimation methods (e.g., Lee, 2011), in which the parameter estimates of an individual 
participant are influenced by the rest of the group. A final lesson from the mathematical 
modeling community is that not just the average response time and accuracy in each task 
condition are informative, but subtle differences in the shape of the distribution can tell us a lot 
as well. For example, in the drift diffusion model, different model parameters cause distinct 
differences in the simulated response time distribution, and this is what allows the modeler to 
distinguish them (Ratcliff et al., 2016). It may be interesting for cognitive modelers to not just 
focus on the average of a response time distribution but also other aspects of its shape.  
This conference brought together two communities that do not seem to regularly consider each 
other’s work and by being co-located and to some degree integrated, facilitated the mixing of 
perspectives and development of shared experiences. Both communities most likely benefited 
from this interaction. That synergy fueled by the novelty of the interactions is potentially 
dependent on the relative lack of familiarity of the two communities. Further integration of the 
two communities may not enhance or even repeat the effect because of the differences that 
caused them to arise separately in the first place. On the other hand, if serious discussions take 
place about the approaches and assumptions within each field, the two communities have the 
potential to strengthen each other. 
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